The IAEA aren't the biggest fans of Israel. Here are their findings. Are they liars, peenace?
Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in Fordow in as little as two to three days.
Iran can convert its current stock of 60 percent enriched uranium into 233 kg of WGU in three weeks at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), enough for 9 nuclear weapons, taken as 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) per weapon.
Breaking out in both Fordow and the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), the two facilities together could produce enough WGU for 11 nuclear weapons in the first month, enough for 15 nuclear weapons by the end of the second month, 19 by the end of the third month, 21 by the end of the fourth month, and 22 by the end of the fifth month.
In front of the inspectors’ eyes, Iran is undertaking the near-final step of breaking out, now converting its 20 percent stock of enriched uranium into 60 percent enriched uranium at a greatly expanded rate, although this rate cannot be sustained much longer (see below).
Iran has no civilian use or justification for its production of 60 percent enriched uranium, particularly at the level of hundreds of kilograms. Its rush to make much more, quickly depleting its stock of near 20 percent enriched uranium, which has a civilian use in research reactors, raises more questions. Even if one believed the production of 60 percent is to create bargaining leverage in a nuclear negotiation, Iran has gone way beyond what would be needed. One has to conclude that Iran’s real intent is to be prepared to produce large quantities of WGU as quickly as possible, in as few centrifuges as possible.